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I. INTRODUCTION
Charles and Patricia Geiger never thought they would have to spend a night in
jail, but on March 1, 2011 that is exactly what happened.1 The couple was arrested
and Charles charged with felonious assault from a hit and run incident with an offduty Cleveland Police officer.2 The incident occurred when the officer approached
an SUV that had made an illegal U-turn; the SUV responded by speeding off, hitting
and injuring the officer.3 The Geigers were questioned and eventually arrested based
on the officer’s eyewitness identification of Mr. Geiger as the driver and his
statement that the license plate number of the vehicle involved matched that of the
Geigers’.4 Based on this evidence, the couple was arrested that evening of March 1,
2011 and spent over twenty hours in jail before finally being released on bail.5 The
only problem is, at the time of the incident, neither of the Geigers were in the area.6
Charles Geiger was eating dinner at a local restaurant with his daughter, an event

1
Leila Atassi, Still No Apology for Lakewood Couple After 20 Hours in Jail for Crime
They Did Not Commit, P LAIN D EALER (Apr. 20, 2011, 12:10 PM),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/04/still_no_apology_for_lakewood.html.
2

Michael Sangiacomo, Former Lakewood School Board Member Accused of Assaulting
a Cleveland Police Officer, P LAIN D EALER (Mar. 4, 2011, 9:58 PM),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/03/former_lakewood_school_board_m.html.
3

Atassi, supra note 1.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/9

2

2013]

STRIKING A BALANCE

531

that was captured on a security camera.7 Multiple witnesses swore that Mrs.
Geiger’s SUV was not in the officer’s vicinity that evening.8 After this evidence
came to light, the police stopped their investigation and the Prosecutor’s Office
moved to dismiss the pending charges against Charles Geiger.9
Because their ordeal occurred before July 1, 2011, the Geigers’ nightmare ended
with nothing more than bad memories and residual animosity over their unfortunate
time in jail.10 Under Ohio’s new felony-arrestee DNA statute, however, the Geigers’
ordeal would not have ended with dismissal of the charges.11 Instead, during the
booking process, Mr. Geiger would have been required to submit to a DNA
collection procedure and his DNA specimen would have been added to the state’s
DNA database.12 Once his DNA profile was in the database, it would be subject to
almost unlimited searches, and the only recourse available to Mr. Geiger would be
the pursuit of a lengthy record sealing process.13 The bottom line is, because of the
arresting police department’s error, the government would permanently retain
Geiger’s DNA sample.14 The Geigers’ case is sadly not unique, as tens of thousands
of Ohio’s over 300,000 annual felony arrestees will never be convicted.15

7

See Leila Atassi, Surveillance Video that Cleared Geiger, P LAIN D EALER (Apr. 8, 2011,
4:35 PM), http://videos.cleveland.com/plain-dealer/2011/04/surveillance_video_that_cleare.
html.
8

Atassi, supra note 1.

9

Id.

10

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012). July 1, 2011 is when the felonyarrestee portion of the statute took effect.
11

Id.

12

Id. Mrs. Geiger was charged with obstructing justice which, under current Ohio law, is
a misdemeanor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.32 (LexisNexis 2013). Therefore, during her
booking process, she would not have been required to submit to a DNA specimen collection
procedure.
13

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (LexisNexis 2012).

14

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

15

In 2009, Ohio reported 302,529 arrests for violent and property crimes to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). O FFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE S ERVS., O HIO D EP’T OF P UB.
S AFETY, O HIO CRIMINAL JUSTICE S TATISTICS 32 (2010). The FBI also estimates the total
number of such crimes in Ohio, with the estimates for the last 10 years never dipping below
400,000. Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF I NVESTIGATION,
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (select “Ohio” for
part (a); “Number of violent crimes” and “Number of property crimes” for part (b); and “2000
to 2010” for part (c); then select “Get Table” button). Ohio does not keep statistics of the
disposition of felony arrests, but in states such as California, where such statistics are kept, the
conviction rate varied from 67.5 to 71.0 percent. ATT’Y GEN. OF C AL., ADULT FELONY
ARREST DISPOSITIONS 2000-2005 (2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications
/candd/cd05/tabs/2005Table39.pdf. A study of New York City’s arrests and dispositions
found that over 40 percent of those arrested were never prosecuted. V ERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
F ELONY ARRESTS: THEIR P ROSECUTION AND D ISPOSITION IN NEW Y ORK CITY’ S COURTS
(Malcolm Feeley ed., rev. ed. 1980).
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Increasing law enforcement’s ability to obtain DNA evidence is one of the recent
trends in legislation across the country.16 The importance of DNA evidence in
solving crimes has led to a nationwide increase in felony-arrestee DNA statutes.17
Felony-arrestee DNA statutes require the arresting law enforcement agency to take a
DNA sample from every person arrested for a felony as part of the booking
procedure.18 Ohio has recently joined this national trend, and in an attempt to
increase the number of samples in its DNA database, has authorized the collection of
DNA from all felony arrestees.19
This Note argues that Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute violates Article I,
section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.20 The initial physical swab and the subsequent database searches of an
arrestee’s DNA sample, while the arrestee is in custody or being prosecuted, do not
violate the Fourth Amendment.21 However, the inclusion of an innocent person’s
DNA in Ohio’s DNA database, subject to repeated searches over time, violates both
the Ohio and federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.22
Broadly written DNA statutes trample people’s civil rights, and more carefully
drawn legislation could meet the same law enforcement goals.23 The legislature
should revise Ohio’s felony-arrestee statute, balancing law enforcement’s interest in
solving crimes with the civil liberties of arrestees.
Part II of this Note explains the background of the Ohio DNA statute and the
broader nationwide trend of statutes designed to increase DNA databases. Part III
explores the relevant precedents and the protections available under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. Part IV
shows that under the Ohio Supreme Court’s current understanding of Article I, § 14
and the Fourth Amendment, the felony-arrestee statute is unconstitutional. Part V
proposes a revision of the statute that both cures the law of its constitutional defects
and provides law enforcement officials with a constitutional and effective way to
16
2011 DNA Database Legislation, DNAR ESOURCE.COM (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.
cqstatetrack.com/texis/viewrpt/main.html?event=495bdbf6ba.
17
DNAR ESOURCE. COM , STATE THAT HAVE PASSED ARRESTEE DNA DATABASE LAWS
(Sept. 2011), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ArresteeDNALaws2011.pdf (sic).
18
The moniker “felony-arrestee” refers generally to statutes requiring all felony arrestees,
instead of those requiring samples from specific offenders, all arrestees, or convicted felons.
See Ashley Eiler, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection
Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 1201, 1206-07
(2011) (discussing the growth in felony arrestee statutes); Robert Berlet, A Step Too Far: Due
Process and DNA Collection in California After Proposition 69, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1481, 1494-95 (2007) (explaining the expansion of California’s DNA sampling from a few
specific felonies to any felony arrestee).
19

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

20

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

21

See infra Part III.B.

22

See infra Part III.B.

23

42 U.S.C.S. § 14135 (LexisNexis 2012) (federal statute providing funding to states to
update DNA statutes).
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increase Ohio’s DNA database while safeguarding the rights of innocent Ohio
citizens.
II. DNA STATUTES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
On July 1, 2011, Ohio joined twelve other states that currently take DNA
samples from all felony arrestees.24 With the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 77 in July
2010, the Ohio legislature revised the DNA collection statute to require that the
arresting law enforcement agency take a DNA sample from all felony arrestees over
the age of eighteen.25
Ohio created a DNA database in 1995.26 Since its creation, the database has been
expanded to include DNA samples from juvenile offenders, convicted felons, sex
offenders, and some violent felony offenders.27 Under current Ohio law, the
arresting law enforcement agency is required to take a DNA sample from all felony
arrestees as part of the booking procedure.28 These samples are processed into
profiles and turned over to the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
(BCII) to be added to Ohio’s DNA database.29 The profiles and samples will be
retained and subject to repeated comparisons with future samples from crime scenes
or other subjects as part of an investigation.30

24

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012); ALA. CODE § 36-18-25
(LexisNexis 2012); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (Deering
2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-23-103 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (LexisNexis 2013);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-3-10 (LexisNexis 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-03 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3620 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-5 (2012) (stating “[a]ny person who is convicted or
adjudicated delinquent for a qualifying offense,” where all qualifying offenses are defined in §
23-5A-1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1933 (2013).
25

S.B. 77, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010). The new statutory language

reads:
On and after July 1, 2011, a person who is eighteen years of age or older and who is
arrested on or after July 1, 2011, for a felony offense shall submit to a DNA specimen
collection procedure administered by the head of the arresting law enforcement
agency. The head of the arresting law enforcement agency shall cause the DNA
specimen to be collected from the person during the intake process at the jail,
community-based correctional facility, detention facility or law enforcement agency
office or station to which the arrested person is taken after the arrest.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).
26
S.B. 5, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 109.573 (LexisNexis 2012)).
27

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.573, 313.08, 2152.74, 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).
(dealing with the collection of DNA specimens, but for this Note the focus will be on the
felony-arrestee DNA statute in § 2901.07).
28

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).

29

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

30

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.573 (LexisNexis 2012).
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All fifty states and the federal government have some sort of DNA database.31
All of the databases include samples from convicted offenders and those on
probation.32 Exactly half of the states take samples from murder arrestees and those
arrested for sex crimes.33 A majority of states include juvenile offenders’ samples in
a database.34
The addition of each of these groups to the DNA databases was not without legal
challenges.35 Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the
constitutionality of these additions, the federal circuit courts have upheld the federal
DNA statute’s requirement of sampling from convicted offenders and parolees.36
State courts have also generally found post-conviction DNA sampling to be
constitutional.37 Ohio is no exception, and the Ohio courts have upheld the additions
of DNA samples from convicted offenders and juvenile offenders.38
The success of DNA evidence has resulted in a push for new legislation to
expand the number of samples included in databases.39 A great deal of the
legislation deals with the administration of growing databases.40 In 2011, five states
proposed new legislation requiring samples from all felony arrestees, while another
six states proposed legislation expanding the number of qualifying offenses that
require a DNA sample.41 The proliferation of DNA databases and the increase of
31
“All fifty states have enacted DNA database statutes and courts have almost uniformly
held that they do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1133
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gaines v. State, 998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)); Doles v. State, 994
P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo. 1999); Landry v. Att’y. Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999).
32

DNAR ESOURCE. COM , STATE DNA DATABASE LAWS QUALIFYING OFFENSES (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses 2011.pdf.
33

Id.

34

Id.

35

See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007).

36

See, e.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Nicholas v. Goord, 430
F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Banks v. United States, 490
F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).
37

See, e.g., State v. Norman, 660 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 2003).

38

In re Nicholson, 724 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the taking
of a juvenile offender’s DNA does not violate the Fourth Amendment); State v. Steele, 802
N.E.2d 1127, 1137 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the taking of a blood sample from a
convict without individualized suspicion did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the
special needs test).
39

See, e.g., S.B. 268, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.07 to require that persons indicted for a felony submit to DNA collection
procedures when they are arraigned, and requiring courts to order those persons either arrested
or indicted for a felony who did not submit to a DNA collection procedure to do so).
40

2009 Miscellaneous DNA Legislation, DNAR ESOURCE. COM (Jan. 21, 2012),
http://www.cqstatetrack.com/texis/viewrpt/main.html?event=495bd5e512a.
41
West Virginia, Mississippi, Iowa, Georgia, and Connecticut have proposed sampling
from all felony arrestees, while New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Indiana, Illinois, and
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legislation allowing the taking of DNA samples without a warrant or individualized
suspicion have led to inevitable court challenges.42 On July 30, 2012, the United
States Supreme Court stayed the decision in King v. State, a Maryland Court of
Appeals decision holding Maryland’s felony-arrestee statute unconstitutional.43 On
November 9, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, and oral
arguments were held February 26, 2013.44
Ohio courts will likely have to determine whether Ohio’s statute conforms to the
Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This Note describes why Ohio courts should find the statute unconstitutional, and
encourages the Ohio legislature to adopt a solution that balances law enforcement’s
interest in effectively solving crime with a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.
A. The Fourth Amendment, Article I, § 14, and DNA Samples as Searches
1. The Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people from
government intrusions that amount to unreasonable searches and seizures.45 The
modern understanding of the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is
based on whether or not the intrusion violates the subject’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.46 The test for reasonableness has two parts: (1) the individual has a
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation is recognized as
objectively reasonable by society.47 The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that

Hawaii have legislation expanding the number of qualifying offenses. 2011 DNA Database
Legislation, DNARESOURCE.COM (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.cqstatetrack.com/texis
/viewrpt/main.html?event=495bdbf6ba.
42
For federal circuit courts, see Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009),
aff’d sub nom. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pool, 621
F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32542, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172CJS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45333 (W.D.N.Y Feb. 14, 2011). For state court cases, see In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722
N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007);
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted by 262
P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
43

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012).

44

King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).

45

U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
46

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

47

Id.
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Article I, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution does not provide any further
protections than what is provided under the Fourth Amendment.48
The protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution
only apply to government intrusions that amount to searches or seizures.49 Arrestee
DNA statutes involve a two-part search.50 The first is the physical bodily intrusion
to collect the actual DNA sample.51 The second is an informational search when the
DNA profile is created, added to the DNA database, and compared to other DNA
samples.52 It is on this second part that courts focus their analysis when determining
the constitutionality of arrestee DNA statutes.53
2. Ohio’s DNA Statute: Multiple and Potentially Endless Searches
Arrestee DNA statutes create a scheme that requires multiple searches.54 Under
Ohio’s statutory scheme, the taking of a DNA sample by law enforcement happens
as part of the booking procedure.55 The arresting law enforcement agency takes a
sample by buccal swab and sends it to the BCII.56 The sample is then analyzed and
compared to the current collection of samples in the DNA database.57 The sample
will also be added to the DNA database for comparison to samples collected in the
future.58
48

State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-67 (Ohio 1997). This is not a surprising
decision, as Article I, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution differs from the Fourth Amendment
by only one word.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14.
49

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; OHIO C ONST. art. I, § 14.

50
See, e.g., People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for
review granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (“The collection of the DNA sample, however, is
only the first part of the search authorized by the DNA Act; the second occurs when the DNA
sample is analyzed and a profile created for use in state and federal DNA databases.”).
51

Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (“Courts have routinely held that the collection of DNA
by means of a blood test is a minimal intrusion into an individual’s privacy interest in bodily
integrity.”).
52

Id.

53

Id. (“The latter search is the true focus of our analysis and the analyses of other courts
that have considered the validity of the DNA statutes.”).
54

Eiler, supra note 18, at 1209.

55

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

56

A buccal swab is the use of a cotton-tipped applicator to collect cheek cells from the
inside of the subject’s mouth, which is a good source of DNA. Questions & Answers About
Buccal Swabs, NAT’ L M ARROW DONOR P ROGRAM (Mar. 16, 2006), http://www.lssu.edu/
campuslife/documents/buccal_swab_qa_032306.pdf.
57

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

58

Id.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the forcible compulsion to collect
blood samples is a search under the Fourth Amendment.59 The taking of a breath
sample is also a search.60 The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that bodily intrusions
for “blood, breath and urine testing ‘must be deemed Fourth Amendment
searches.’”61 The taking of a buccal swab is arguably less intrusive than the taking
of a blood sample on the spectrum of bodily intrusions, but is more intrusive than
administering a breath test.62 Although the issue of buccal cheek swabs as searches
has never been decided in Ohio, the weight of commentators, other courts, and
precedent as to other search methods strongly points to the conclusion that it would
also be considered a search.63
In addition to the initial swab search, a second search occurs each time a new
DNA profile is created and compared to the existing DNA profiles in the database.64
An individual has an objectively reasonable privacy interest in the genetic
information that each profile contains.65 The information that can be gleaned from
one’s DNA profile includes information about diseases and propensity for certain
behavioral traits, and can even reveal private information about the individual’s
genetically-related family members.66 Society has an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in DNA samples, because by its very nature an individual’s
sample reveals a wealth of information about other individuals not legally included
in the DNA database.67
59

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

60

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).

61

State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981, 986
(Ohio 2002) (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618).
62

Eiler, supra note 18, at 1210.

63 Id.; People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review
granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); Ohio AFL-CIO, 780 N.E.2d at 986.
64 Eiler, supra note 18, at 1209 (arguing that the federal statute creates “three distinct
phases that constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment”).
65

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on the physical intrusion rather than considering
the information obtained from the search).
66
Id.; see also D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL
J.L. & P UB. P OL’Y 455, 481-82 (2001); Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a
Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the
Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. M ED. & ETHICS 165, 169-170 (2006). In fact, states have begun
to recognize what potentially valuable resources partial matches based on familial
relationships are. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DNA PARTICLE MATCH (CRIME SCENE
DNA PROFILE TO OFFENDER) POLICY (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/
documents/CAfamilialpolicy.pdf.
67
Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offender’s Kin, 34 J.L. M ED & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006). The federal database attempts to
remedy this issue by only including “junk DNA” profiles which are intended to limit the
amount of personal information available while still being able to uniquely identify a
particular person. However, junk DNA can already yield evidence of a person’s race, sex,
geographic or ethic origins, genetic family relationships, and is believed to contain a wealth of
information relating to one’s personal behavioral traits and medical information. Eiler, supra
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The structure of the DNA statute creates the possibility that exonerated or
innocent people would be subject to repetitive privacy intrusions over the course of
their lifetime and beyond, merely for having the misfortune of participating in the
standard booking procedure of Ohio.68
B. Totality of the Circumstances vs. Special Needs Doctrine
1. The Totality of the Circumstances Test and Post Conviction DNA Statutes
Federal and state courts have almost unanimously upheld the taking of DNA
samples from convicted felons and parolees.69 Courts upholding the sampling of
convicted offenders and parolees have differed on the correct test to apply. Some
courts apply the totality of the circumstances test, while others apply the special
needs exception.70 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is unique in that it determined
that the federal post-conviction DNA statute satisfied both tests, and thus, it will be
the focus of this discussion.71
The totality of the circumstances test is a balancing test that the Supreme Court
has applied to determine the validity of warrantless searches under the Fourth
Amendment.72 The reasoning behind the totality of the circumstances test is based
note 18, at 1211-12; Jennifer K. Wagner, Out with the “Junk DNA” Phrase, 58 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 1 (2012); Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 54, 57 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
Colloquy/2007/23/LRColl2007n23Cole.pdf; Justin Gillis, Genetic Code of Mouse Published;
Comparison with Human Genome Indicates “Junk DNA” May be Vital, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,
2002, at A1. See W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, 289 S CI. AM .
46 (2003), for a more detailed discussion of junk DNA.
68

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

69

Twelve federal circuit courts that have heard cases dealing with post conviction DNA
statutes have upheld them as constitutional. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
2007); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek,
402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Green v. Berge, 354
F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir.
2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992). State courts, including Ohio, have also upheld post-conviction
DNA statutes. See, e.g., State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
70

See Conley, 453 F.3d at 679, 681 (upholding the taking of a probationer’s DNA under
both the special needs doctrine and the totality of the circumstances approach); see also
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832 (applying the totality of the circumstances test); Goord, 430 F.3d at
667 (applying the special needs doctrine).
71

Conley, 453 F.3d at 679, 681.

72

The balancing test first appeared in Camera v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523, 536-537 (1967) (stating that a balancing test is the best way to determine if a search is
reasonable). For the test applied to warrantless criminal searches, see United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-22 (2001) (upholding the warrantless search of a probationer’s
home when law enforcement suspected that probationer was involved in arson-related crimes
because the state’s interest in searching the home outweighed the probationer’s diminished
expectation of privacy) and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852-53 (2006) (upholding
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on the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.73 The court weighs
the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the intrusiveness of the
government’s incursion against the legitimate government interest in effective law
enforcement.74
A number of state and federal courts have applied this test to statutes requiring a
DNA sample from convicted felons or those on supervised release.75 In making this
determination, one factor in particular the courts have relied on is that offenders have
a lower expectation of privacy than innocent individuals.76 The courts then weigh
the offender’s lowered expectation of privacy and the minimally intrusive nature of
the sampling against the government’s interest in solving future crimes.77
In United States v. Conley, the Sixth Circuit applied the totality of the
circumstances test in upholding the federal post-conviction DNA statutes as applied
to a parolee.78 The court first rejected the petitioner’s assertion that the statute was
unconstitutional because the Fourth Amendment required some individualized
suspicion for a warrantless search.79 The court determined that individualized
suspicion was not required for a search to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.80 The court reasoned that as a probationer, the petitioner had a “greatly
reduced expectation of privacy.”81 The court, weighing the reduced expectation of
privacy against the government’s interest in identification of convicted felons and
the minimal intrusion involved in blood sampling, found the search reasonable.82

law enforcement’s stop and search of a parolee without individualized suspicion because of a
parolee’s diminished expectation of privacy and the state’s substantial interest in supervising
parolees).
73

“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of
a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.’” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (2001) (citing Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
74
Mich. State Police Dep’t v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not always require a warrant or probable cause if the intrusion is only minor
and supported by a compelling government interest in law enforcement).
75

For federal circuit courts using the totality of the circumstances approach to analysis
sampling from offenders, see, e.g., Conley, 453 F.3d at 681. For state courts applying the
same method, see Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000); Doles v. State, 994
P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999); In re Maricopa, 930 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ariz. 1997).
76

See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).

77

State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gaines v. State,
998 P.2d 166 (Nev. 2000)); Landry v. Att’y. Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999).
78

Conley, 453 F.3d at 680-81.

79

Id. at 677.

80

Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)).

81

Id. at 680.

82

Id. at 680-81.
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Ohio courts have applied this test in upholding a statute requiring DNA samples
from juvenile offenders convicted of gross sexual imposition.83 The Ohio appellate
court compared the diminished constitutional rights of the juvenile probationer and
the minimal intrusion of drawing blood with the government’s legitimate interest in
deterring future sex offenders and solving other crimes.84 The court held that the
search was reasonable because it was minimally intrusive and justified by the
government’s legitimate “interest in keeping a DNA data bank.”85
2. The Special Needs Doctrine and Post Conviction DNA Statutes
The “special needs” doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for when
the circumstances render “the warrant or probable cause requirement impractical.”86
The Supreme Court has upheld “certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the
program was designed to serve ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.’”87 The special needs doctrine involves a two-part inquiry: the court
must determine (1) whether the statute presents a valid special need and then (2)
balance the individual’s privacy interest with the special need of the government.88
In determining whether the government has a valid special need, the critical inquiry
is whether or not the search in question is simply to further ordinary law
enforcement objectives.89 Therefore, unless there is something more than a “general
interest in crime control” to justify the search, the “special needs” doctrine will not
apply.90 If there is a valid special need, the court must then balance the individual’s
privacy interest with the special need of the government to determine if the search
violates the Fourth Amendment.91
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the “special needs” doctrine to
uphold the post conviction DNA statute in Conley.92 The court found three valid
special needs of the government beyond general law enforcement: (1) obtaining
reliable proof of a felon’s identity, (2) deterring convicted felons from committing

83

In re Nicholson, 724 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio App. Ct. 1999).

84

Id. at 1221.

85

Id.

86

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

87

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (invalidating a roadside check
point for the purpose of detecting illegal drugs) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing program for student-athletes)); Treasury
Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding drug testing for government employees
seeking promotions or transfers to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug testing for railway employees involved in accidents or in
violation of safety regulations).
88

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-81 (2001); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.

89

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.

90

Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979)).

91

State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1137 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ferguson, 532 U.S.
67 and Edmond, 531 U.S. 32).
92

United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 677-79 (6th Cir. 2006).
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additional crimes, and (3) protecting communities.93 The court then weighed the
special needs of the government “in obtaining Conley’s DNA” and found the needs
outweighed “her greatly reduced expectation of privacy as a convicted felon.”94
In State v. Steel, the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the First District applied the
“special needs” doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of an Ohio law requiring the
collection of a DNA sample from convicted offenders.95 The court determined that
the DNA statute had two purposes beyond normal law enforcement: (1) increasing
the accuracy of the criminal justice system and (2) the solving of future crimes not
yet committed.96 The court then evaluated the statute by balancing the intrusion into
the individual’s privacy interest and a probationer’s diminished expectation of
privacy with the previously stated special needs.97 The court determined that the
taking of a DNA sample was reasonable even without individualized suspicion under
the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment.98
Conley and Steele are examples of why the use of the special needs doctrine to
analyze DNA statutes in general is problematic.99 Courts have listed some of the
following purposes as beyond those of normal law enforcement: (1) determining the
identity of felons, (2) deterring future crimes, (3) protecting communities, (4)
improving accuracy in the criminal justice system, and (5) solving future crimes.100
The problem is that protecting communities, deterring future crimes, and solving
future crimes are exactly what law enforcement agencies are designed to do.101 The
other two special needs proposed involve properly identifying convicted felons.102
Identifying felons may appear on its face to be separate from “normal law
enforcement purposes,” but the identification of felons serves one primary purpose:
solving crimes.103 Solving crimes is a general law enforcement purpose.104 The use
of the special needs doctrine in these cases is an example of courts wanting to uphold
a useful crime-solving tool while rigidly adhering to precedent. The end result is a
93

Id. at 679.

94

Id.

95

Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1137. The law in question is actually an earlier incarnation of the
current felony-arrestee DNA statute that required sampling only from convicted offenders.
96

Id. at 1136.

97

Id. at 1137.

98

Id.

99

Id.; Conley, 453 F.3d 674.

100

Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1136; Conley, 453 F.3d at 679.

101

See, e.g., Division of Police, CITY OF LAKEWOOD, O HIO, http://onelakewood.com/
PublicSafety/Police/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (explaining what police departments are
designed for, as described in the City of Lakewood, Ohio’s Police Departments Missions
statement).
102

Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1136; Conley, 453 F.3d at 679.

103

The court in Steele actually admitted that some of what it described as valid “specialneed searches . . . may ultimately be used for law enforcement purposes.” Steele, 802 N.E.2d
at 1136.
104

See cases cited supra note 87.
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misapplication of the special needs doctrine, which in its current form cannot be
used to uphold convicted offender DNA statutes.105
C. Application of Fourth Amendment Tests to Arrestee DNA Statutes
The previous decisions dealt with DNA statutes as applied to convicted felons or
parolees; Ohio’s felony-arrestee statute is broader because it applies to all persons
arrested for a felony.106 Early applications of the Fourth Amendment to arrestee
DNA statutes found both state and federal courts holding that the special needs
doctrine does not apply, and instead analyzed the statutes under the totality of the
circumstances test.107 The Ninth and Third Federal Circuits and the Supreme Court
of Virginia have all upheld arrestee DNA statutes as constitutional.108 State courts in
California, Maryland, and Minnesota and some federal district courts have held
arrestee DNA statutes to be unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment under
the totality of the circumstances test.109
1. Totality of Circumstances Test
United States v. Mitchell, People v. Buza, Haskell v. Harris, and King v. State are
all examples of how courts applying the totality of the circumstances test have
reached different outcomes.110 In United States v. Mitchell, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the federal all-arrestee DNA statutes as constitutional when
applied to a person arrested for “possession with intent to distribute cocaine.”111
Mitchell objected to the government’s attempt to collect a DNA sample after his
indictment, claiming that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on

105
John D. Biancamano, Note, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection
Statutes and their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO S T. L.J. 619, 655-59 (2009).
106

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

107

See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); People v.
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted by 262 P.3d 854
(Cal. 2011); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981,
986 (Ohio 2002).
108

See Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387; Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson
v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007) (holding that DNA sampling from all felony
arrestees based on probable cause was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
109

See United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32542, at
*1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying government’s motion to compel DNA samples); Buza,
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (holding that taking a DNA sample from all felony arrestees as part of
the booking process was a violation of the Fourth Amendment); King v. State, 42 A.3d 549
(Md. 2012) (holding that Maryland’s felony-arrestee DNA law is unconstitutional as applied
to an arrestee, never convicted of the crime of arrest, whose sample was used to convict him
of a previous rape); In re Welfare of C.T.L., Juvenile, 722 N.W.2d 484, (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that taking a DNA sample from a juvenile arrestee prior to conviction was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment).
110

Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753; Haskell, 669 F.3d 1049; King, 42
A.3d 549.
111

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 389.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/9

14

2013]

STRIKING A BALANCE

543

unreasonable searches.112 The district court found that “Mitchell’s status as an
arrestee and a pretrial detainee” meant that he “‘ha[d] a diminished expectation of
privacy in his identity’ and thus [could] be subjected to routine booking procedures
such as fingerprinting.”113 The district court, however, did not agree that a
fingerprint and the taking of a DNA sample amounted to the same level of intrusion
and thus held that the statute was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.114 The Third Circuit reversed, determining that DNA collection from
arrestees and pretrial detainees does not violate the Fourth Amendment.115
The court first determined that a DNA profile was “a tool for establishing
identity,” and therefore the issue was how great was Mitchell’s “expectation of
privacy in his . . . own identity.”116 The government in Mitchell’s case had already
been convinced there was probable cause to believe he committed a crime.117 The
court concluded, “[i]n light of this probable cause finding, arrestees possess a
diminished expectation of privacy in their own identity.”118 The diminished
expectation of privacy justified the taking of fingerprints, photographs, and DNA
profiles for identification purposes.119
The next step in the court’s analysis was to determine to what degree the search
was necessary to promote a legitimate government interest.120 The court concluded
that the government had a “strong interest in identifying arrestees.”121 DNA
provides the government with a more reliable process to identify criminals who have
changed their name or appearance, making DNA an important to tool to accurately
identify the arrestee.122 The court then balanced the diminished expectation of
privacy that an arrestee possesses in his or her identity against the legitimate
government interest in accurately identifying criminals and the minimal privacy
intrusion because of the safeguards provided to limit the amount of personal
information revealed.123 The court held that the government’s interest and the
minimal intrusion outweighed an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy.124
112

Id.; 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2013) (allowing the government to
collect DNA samples from “individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted”).
113
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608
(W.D. Pa. 2009)).
114

Id.

115

Id. at 416.

116

Id. at 410 (“Instead, the critical question is whether arrestees and pretrial detainees who
have not been convicted of felonies have a diminished privacy interest in their identity.”).
117

Id. at 412.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 413.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 414.

123

Id. at 415-16.

124

Id.
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In People v. Buza, the California Appellate Court determined that California’s
statute requiring the sampling from an arrestee during the booking procedure
violated the appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.125 This case involved a person required to submit to a DNA
collection procedure before there had been any judicial determination of probable
cause.126 The court in Buza applied the totality of the circumstances test, but took a
different view on a couple of the factors in the balancing test. For one, it concluded
that the primary purpose of California’s arrestee DNA statute was not identification
of arrestees.127 Instead, the court stated, “[t]here can be no doubt that this use of
DNA samples is for purposes of criminal investigation rather than simple
identification.”128 Another factor on which the court in Buza differed was the
arrestee’s expectation of privacy.129 The court did not agree that arrestees have a
diminished expectation of privacy, because there had been no judicial finding of
probable cause.130
The court then weighed the intrusion into the privacy rights of the arrestee
against the government’s interest in having a valuable crime-solving tool.131 The
court held that since identification was not the purpose of the statute and the
government’s interest in a useful crime-fighting tool could not outweigh a person’s
expectation of privacy, California’s felony-arrestee DNA statute was
unconstitutional.132
Haskell v. Harris involved a challenge to California’s felony-arrestee law by four
plaintiffs who were arrested and required to give a DNA sample but never
convicted.133 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s denial of
a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the felony-arrestee sampling
provision.134

125
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
126

Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 766.

127
Id. at 772-75 (stating that DNA samples are not necessary or feasible for quickly
identifying an arrestee as it can take over a month for the sample to be entered into the
database).
128

Id. at 774.

129

Id. at 779.

130

Id. at 782 (“[A]n individual such as appellant, who has not yet been the subject of a
judicial determination of probable cause, falls closer to the ordinary citizen end of the
continuum than one as to whom probable cause has been found by a judicial officer or grand
jury.”).
131

Id. at 782-83.

132

Id. at 783 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“‘[T]he mere fact that
law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment.’ If it did, the State could take a DNA sample from every citizen and use
it for investigative purpose, an Orwellian prospect.”)).
133

Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).

134

Id. at 1065.
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The majority in Haskell applied the totality of the circumstances test, balancing
the privacy interests of the plaintiffs with the government’s interest in law
enforcement.135
The privacy expectation, according to the majority, was
“significantly diminished” by the multitude of evasive and degrading searches that
can take place as part of the booking procedure.136 The court concluded that there
was not a significant privacy right to intrude upon due to the low expectation of
privacy at booking, combined with the minimal intrusiveness of the search and the
safeguards imposed by the law.137 The majority found that the government had four
important interests: “identifying arrestees, solving past crimes, preventing future
crimes, and exonerating the innocent.”138 After balancing the factors and weighing
in favor of the government against the diminished expectation of privacy, the
majority held that California’s felony-arrestee DNA law was not an unreasonable
violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus the district court was correct in
rejecting the preliminary injunction.139
The dissent in Haskell argued that the California law was unconstitutional based
on three alternative theories.140 The first was that Friedman v. Boucher directly
prohibits the taking of DNA from an arrestee without a warrant or “suspicion of a
crime that the DNA might solve.”141 The next argument was that DNA is analogous
to fingerprinting and that DNA testing, like fingerprinting, can only be used to
identify suspects, not for investigation purposes.142 The second argument relied on a
line of cases stating that fingerprints taken for investigation without consent, a
warrant, or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.143 The dissent applied
this reasoning to hold that taking DNA “without a warrant, and without suspicion of
any crime committed by the arrestee that the DNA will help solve, violates the
Fourth Amendment.”144 Lastly, the dissent briefly mentioned that the majority
overstated the government’s interest and understated the plaintiffs’ privacy
expectations.145
135

Id. at 1057-58.

136

Id. at 1058.

137

Id. at 1062.

138

Id.

139

Id. at 1066.

140

Id. at 1066-67 (Fetcher, J., dissenting).

141

Id. at 1069 (citing Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009) (involving
Nevada police forcibly taking a DNA sample from a person arrested for a crime committed in
Montana, when there was no Nevada law allowing the warrantless taking of a DNA sample;
the majority distinguishes Friedman quite convincingly based on the fact that it only applies
to the very narrow factual situation that it involved)).
142

Id. at 1073.

143
Id. at 1076 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811 (1985); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2005)).
144

Id.

145

Id.
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King v. State involved facial and as applied challenges to the Maryland arrestee
DNA statute.146 The defendant, Alonzo King, was arrested for assault, a qualifying
offense under Maryland's statute.147 His DNA was taken upon arrest and added into
the state's DNA database.148 Prior to the resolution of his assault charges, a DNA
“hit” matched King's sample taken upon arrest with a sample related to an unsolved
rape case.149 The police then obtained a search warrant based on this match and
retrieved another DNA sample that confirmed the original DNA match.150 The DNA
match was the only evidence presented to indict and convict King.151 King was
found guilty of the rape and sentenced to life in prison.152
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to King.153 The court used the totality of the circumstances balancing test
and compared the government’s interest in correctly identifying King with his
reasonable expectation of privacy.154 The court determined that King, as an arrestee,
had a lower expectation of privacy than the general public, but that the presumption
of innocence and the nature of the information collected by DNA sampling
outweighed the government's interest in correctly identifying him.155 The court
rejected the fingerprint analogy and instead compared the information contained in
DNA profiles to a warrantless search of medical records.156 The court agreed with
the Minnesota court of appeals that probable cause for arrest “cannot serve as the
probable cause for a DNA search of an arrestee.”157 The court reasoned that the
government could achieve the same identification through less intrusive means.158
Therefore, the government’s interest in properly identifying criminals did not
outweigh King’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his own genetic material.159
The likelihood of the court’s decision being upheld is doubtful. The court took
the unusual step of granting a stay of the Maryland Court of Appeals’s decision
before granting certiorari.160 Stays are ordered when it is likely the Supreme Court
146

King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553 (Md. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).

147

King, 42 A.3d at 553.

148

Id.

149

Id. at 553-54.

150

Id. at 554.

151

Id.

152

Id. at 555.

153

Id. at 556.

154

Id.

155

Id. at 577.

156

Id. at 576-77.

157

Id. at 578.

158

Id. at 579.

159

Id. at 576-79.

160

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) (granting a stay of the Maryland Court of
Appeals’ decision).
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will grant certiorari, overturn the lower court’s decision, and that denial of the stay
will result in serious harm.161 Oral arguments were held on February 26, 2013.162
The Supreme Court's decision to take the case and the indication it will likely reverse
the Maryland Court of Appeals illustrates the need for clarity in our application of
Fourth Amendment principles to arrestee DNA statutes.
Mitchell, Buza, Haskell, and King are examples of how courts have had difficulty
applying the totality of circumstances test to arrestee DNA laws.163 The different
courts emphasized a number of factors, including the subject’s expectation of
privacy, whether the law provided safeguards for the storing and use of the DNA, the
government’s interest in correctly identifying criminals, and whether there was a
probable cause determination.164 All the cases deal with a timeline from arrest and to
either conviction or release. At what point during that timeline the court decides the
relevant search occurred determines the strength of the relevant factors.
The majority and dissent in Haskell analyzed California’s arrestee law as only
implicating one search: the initial swab.165 The Haskell court, by focusing on the
initial swab as the key search, completely mischaracterized the privacy expectation
of the plaintiffs in the case.166 “Two of the plaintiffs were never charged” with a
crime, while the “other two plaintiffs were charged with felonies, but the charges
were dismissed.”167 The plaintiffs’ expectations of privacy were greater than that of
a recent arrestee with a recent probable cause determination.168 The plaintiffs had
already been released and the charges dropped, making their expectations of privacy
exactly the same as someone who had never been arrested at all.169
Mitchell and Buza, on the other hand, considered the laws to implicate another
search, when the sample was added to the DNA database, and focused analysis on
this search.170
The courts in Mitchell and Buza came to different determinations of the
constitutionality of arrestee DNA laws, but the two cases do not actually contradict
one another.171 The reason is that the court in Mitchell considered an arrestee to
have the same diminished expectation of privacy as a pre-trial detainee after a
161

Id. at 2 (citing Conkright v. Frommert, 556 U.S. 1401, 1402 (2009)).

162

Oral Argument, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-207), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_207.
163

United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); People v. Buza, 129
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal.
2011); Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012).
164

See cases cited supra note 109.

165

Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1058.

166

Id.

167

Id. at 1066.

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011); People v. Buza, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011).
171

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783.
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probable cause determination. However, the court in Buza considered an arrestee’s
expectation of privacy when there was no judicial determination of probable cause to
resemble a person who has never entered the criminal justice system.172 Thus, it
makes a fundamental difference at what point on the timeline the court decided that
the relevant search occurred, and whether the court considers the arrestee’s privacy
expectations to be similar to a convicted offender or those that have never entered
the criminal justice system.173
King is an excellent example of why a different approach for analyzing the
constitutionality of arrestee sampling is needed.174 The Maryland Court of Appeals
correctly identified the government's interest and the defendant's diminished
expectation of privacy.175 The court, however, did not correctly balance the interests
as applied to the defendant.176 The DNA was taken and a profile created, leading to
a match all while King was still awaiting adjudication of his assault charge.177
Therefore, as applied to King, the statute did not violate his Fourth Amendment
protections because the government's interest outweighed his minimal expectation of
privacy. The court did not address the facial challenge to the statute, although they
did express some doubt as to its facial validity.178 The approach presented in Part III
of this Note solves the problems associated with the Maryland Court of Appeals'
application of the totality of the circumstances test while still protecting those
persons whose right to be free from unreasonable searches Maryland's statute
violates.179
The analysis of arrestee DNA sampling in Mitchell and Buza and the
misapplication of the totality of the circumstances test as applied to the plaintiffs in
Haskell and King show the need for a different approach in order to properly analyze
the searches that a felony-arrestee statute implicates.
2. Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs doctrine has never been used to uphold a felony-arrestee DNA
statute.180 Even courts that have found felony-arrestee statutes constitutional have
expressed that the special needs doctrine does not apply.181 Yet some commentators
172

Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782-83.

173

See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411-12; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782-83; Haskell, 669
F.3d at 1065.
174

King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 576-79 (Md. 2012).

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Id. at 553-54.

178

Id. at 553.

179

See infra Part III.A.2.

180

See, e.g., United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32542, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010) (rejecting the special needs doctrine because the needs
indemnified “are for classic law enforcement purposes”).
181
United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated by 659 F.3d 761
(9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the application of the special needs doctrine “because the ‘special
needs’ exception applies only to non-law enforcement purposes”).
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argue that the best way to analyze felony arrestee statutes is under the special needs
doctrine.182 The issue is that courts do not seem ready to accept this as a possibility,
something that commentators proposing changes have been forced to admit.183
Another, more pressing, issue with attempting to analyze arrestee DNA statutes
under the special needs doctrine is that DNA statutes in general do not survive the
first prong of the test.184 The special needs doctrine is meant for things beyond
normal law enforcement purposes.185 As previously discussed, although courts have
used the special needs doctrine to uphold sampling from convicted felons, it is not a
proper application because the special needs provided amount to nothing more than
general law enforcement purposes.186 Many of the same justifications have been
provided for arrestee DNA statutes, namely the identification of criminals that have
already committed crimes and deterring and solving future crimes.187 Since these
justifications are part of general law enforcement purposes, the special needs
doctrine cannot be used to justify the sampling of arrestees.188
3. Anderson v. Commonwealth and the Fingerprint Analogy
The Supreme Court of Virginia has upheld Virginia’s arrestee DNA statute,
analogizing it to taking someone’s fingerprints as part of a normal booking
procedure.189 Other courts have used this analogy of fingerprinting, that appears in
Anderson v. Commonwealth, to support the position that DNA is nothing more than
an identification tool.190
Anderson resulted from a challenge to Virginia’s felony-arrestee DNA statute
that required a sample of Anderson’s DNA to be taken upon arrest and added to the
DNA databank.191 The Virginia Supreme Court held that “[a] DNA sample of the
accused taken upon arrest, while more revealing, is no different in character than
acquiring fingerprints upon arrest.”192 The court then reasoned that since DNA
182
Derek Regensburger, DNA Databanks and the Fourth Amendment: The Time has Come
to Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement and the Primary
Purpose Test, 19 ALB. L.J. S CI. & TECH. 319, 386 (2009) (arguing that the same special
needs that justify profiling convicted offenders apply to arrestees).
183
Id. (“Unfortunately, if the special needs test is applied rather than a balancing test and
the Ferguson/Edmond primary purpose is adhered to, such an extension of DNA testing would
likely be declared invalid.”).
184

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-81 (2001).

185

Id.

186

See supra Part II.B.2.

187

United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 413 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).

188

United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32542, at *1
(E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010).
189

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007).

190

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410 (stating that DNA samples are “used solely as an accurate,
unique identifying maker—in other words as fingerprints for the twenty-first century”).
191

Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704.

192

Id. at 705.
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sampling is no more intrusive than the taking of a fingerprint, and fingerprints are
not a prohibited search under the Fourth Amendment, the minor intrusion of a DNA
sample does not violate the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights because no
individualized suspicion or warrant is required.193
The fingerprint analogy has some serious flaws. For one, fingerprints do not
contain the same type of information that a person’s DNA sample does, and thus do
not implicate the same level of privacy intrusion.194 This is because a DNA sample,
unlike a fingerprint, contains a person’s entire genetic profile, including the ability to
see possible character traits and predisposition to diseases.195 Second, the analogy of
DNA samples with fingerprints does not actually justify the sampling under the
Fourth Amendment.196 Although fingerprinting is a routine practice in this country, it
has never actually been analyzed under the modern understanding of the Fourth
Amendment.197 Thus, using the analogy as support for DNA sampling surviving a
Fourth Amendment analysis is faulty since the practice of fingerprinting has never
actually be considered in that manner.198
4. State v. Emerson and a Person’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a DNA
Profile
The Ohio Supreme Court recently ruled in State v. Emerson that no person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a lawfully-obtained DNA profile.199 The
decision does not discuss the constitutionality of Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute
directly, but in holding that a defendant lack’s standing to object to the use of DNA
profiles, the court effectively upheld the collection and use of DNA profiles from
anyone for any reason.200
In Emerson, the appellant, Dajuan Emerson, was accused of rape in 2005.201 As
a part of this investigation, a DNA sample was obtained pursuant to a valid
warrant.202 Emerson’s DNA sample was processed and a DNA profile created and
included in Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).203 Emerson was eventually
acquitted of the rape charge, but his DNA profile remained in the CODIS database,
subject to repeated searches.204
193

Id. at 705-06.

194

Eiler, supra note 18, at 1211-12.

195

Id. (discussing what type of information is contained in DNA samples).

196

People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 874 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting)).
197

Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 770-71.

198

Id.

199

State v. Emerson, 981 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ohio 2012).

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id.
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In 2007, as part of a murder investigation, the police found blood on a door
handle.205 The blood sample was processed and a DNA profile created, entered into
CODIS, and compared to the other DNA profiles in the database.206 The DNA
profile from the murder scene matched Emerson’s profile still in the database.207 As
a result of this match, Emerson was indicted for aggravated murder, aggravated
burglary, and tampering with evidence.208 After the trial court denied Emerson’s
motion to suppress the DNA evidence, the matter proceeded to trial.209 At trial,
Emerson was convicted of aggravated murder.210
The Ohio Supreme Court granted review on two issues: (1) does a person have
standing to object to the retention and use of a lawfully-obtained DNA profile that
was created from a criminal investigation even if the person was acquitted; and (2)
does the state have the power to retain the profile and use it in subsequent
investigations.211
The court held that a person does not have standing to object to the use of a DNA
profile.212 The court based its reasoning on the fact that other courts around the
country have similarly held that “a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his or her DNA profile extracted from a lawfully obtained DNA sample.”213 The
court determined that a DNA profile, unlike a DNA sample, is “the work product of
the government.”214 Additionally, the court went on to compare the use of DNA
sampling to that of fingerprinting because the DNA profile itself is merely an
identification tool.215
The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis is fundamentally flawed. First, in
determining that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a DNA profile, the
court misidentified exactly what information can be learned for a DNA profile.216
The court reasoned that a DNA profile is merely work product, similar to other
scientific evidence that laboratories create for trial.217 Further, the court’s reasoning
205

Id.

206

Id. at 790.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id.

211

Id.

212

Id. at 793.

213

Id. at 792 (citing Herman v. State 128 F.3d 469 (Nev. 2006) (holding that there was no
standing to sue because “[a] reasonable person would have understood that the resulting DNA
profile, like fingerprints, could be available for general investigative purposes”)); State v.
Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003); Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001).
214

Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 791.

215

Id. at 792.

216

Id. at 792; United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (explaining
that DNA profiles are more predictive than originally believed).
217

Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 792.
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that DNA profiles are merely identification tools similar to fingerprints is
misleading.218 As previously discussed, DNA profiles are much more predictive
than originally believed.219
Second, although the Ohio Supreme Court decision does not directly touch upon
the constitutionality of DNA sampling statutes, the holding that no person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA profile opens the door for
potentially unlimited uses of DNA sampling.220 The only point at which a person
can challenge the government’s intrusion into his or her genetic makeup in Ohio is
when the physical sample is being extracted.221 If the sample is obtained in a lawful
manner, the constitution is satisfied.222 Because of the relative ease in which DNA
can be lawfully obtained, the result of the court’s holding is that genetic information
can be obtained and used in a variety of manners without any available protection.223
The Ohio Supreme Court’s failure to consider the most up to date scientific
understanding of junk-DNA and DNA profiles, as well as the potential implications
of the decision, demonstrates that State v. Emerson is fundamentally flawed.
Moreover, the Emerson decision underscores why this Note’s proposed view of
arrestee DNA statutes, implicating three distinct search types, will provide courts
with a better approach to analyze DNA sampling and profile creation.224
III. W HY OHIO ’S FELONY -ARRESTEE DNA S TATUTE IS U NCONSTITUTIONAL IN
ITS CURRENT FORM
A. Ohio’s Felony Arrestee Statute: Impact and Types of Searches Implicated
1. Impact of Ohio’s Felony-Arrestee Statute
Ohio’s Felony-Arrestee DNA statute requires taking samples from two distinct
groups of people: (1) those that will ultimately be found guilty of the crime of arrest
and (2) those that will have the charges dismissed or be found not guilty at trial.225
The first group of arrestees, those that will become convicted felons, will eventually

218

Id.

219

Kincade, 379 F.3d 813; see also supra note 67.

220

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012) (declaring that Ohio’s felonyarrestee DNA statute may still be challenged, because it mandates warrantless sampling of
arrestees, which the Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled on; however, it is unlikely to be held
unconstitutional as the searches implicated in the profile creation cannot be challenged
according to the reasoning of Emerson).
221

Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 791.

222

Id. at 793.

223

See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that
identifiable quantities of DNA can be found on coffee cups, doorknobs, and other common
items); Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 861 (2006) (noting that Los Angeles police solved
a murder by retrieving DNA from a recently used coffee cup).
224

See infra Part III.A.2.

225

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).
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be required to provide a DNA sample.226 Ohio courts have upheld the sampling of
convicted felons.227 The only change to this first group is how soon the government
collects the sample.228
The real target of Ohio’s new DNA law is the second group: those who are
innocent or whose guilt cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.229 This group
of individuals represents the real addition to the DNA database: before the enactment
of the arrestee DNA law, people in the second group would never have their DNA
samples taken and added to a database.230 In Ohio in 2010, there were 63,870 adults
arrested for violent crimes.231 Additionally, another 314,050 adults were arrested for
property crimes.232
Under the current statutory scheme, all 377,920 of these
arrestees would have had a DNA sample taken as part of their booking procedures.233
Based on reports from other states, anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of arrests never
result in a conviction.234 In 2010 alone, Ohio’s arrestee DNA law would have
resulted in the addition of over 100,000 new samples—of persons who will not be
convicted of a crime—to Ohio’s DNA database that previously were unobtainable.235
This is a substantial increase in the number of samples, considering that as of
October 2011 there were only 398,377 profiles in CODIS from Ohio.236
The substantial increase in the number of samples included in the state’s DNA
database may allow law enforcement to solve a greater number of violent crimes and
crimes of a sexual nature.237 Although there is a clear benefit to Ohio’s law
226

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring that anyone
convicted of a felony submit to a DNA sampling procedure).
227

State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).

228

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).

229

See, e.g., Biancamano, supra note 105, at 654 (“[A]rrestee statutes really only target
individuals who are not ultimately found guilty of the crime for which they have been
arrested.”).
230

S.B. 77, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012)).
231

Uniform Crime Reports Table 69 Arrests by State 2010, F ED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl69.xls. Violent crimes include murder,
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
232

Id. Property crimes are the offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and

arson.
233

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

234

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

235

This number is based on a conservative 30 percent of 2010 arrests not resulting in
convictions. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
236

CODIS—NDIS Statistics, F ED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics/#Ohio.

(Jan.

2013),

237

John Maddux, Comment, Arresting Development: A Call for North Carolina to Expand
Its Forensic Database by Collecting DNA from Felony Arrestees, 32 CAMPBELL L. R EV. 103,
117-19 (2009) (arguing that the benefits of collecting samples from arrest suspects outweigh
the risks).
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enforcement agencies, the repeated search of an innocent person’s DNA as required
by the statutory revision is unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances
balancing test and not justified by the special needs doctrine.238
2. Analyzing Ohio’s Felony-Arrestee DNA Statute as Involving Three Types of
Searches
Generally, courts approach arrestee DNA statutes as containing a two-part
search.239 Part one is the initial buccal swab.240 Courts have routinely held that
bodily invasions similar to buccal swabs are searches that implicate the Fourth
Amendment.241 A buccal swab does not, however, reveal any personal information
unless it is analyzed and included in a searchable database.242 The second search is
the inclusion of the DNA profile in the database and the resulting comparison with
other profiles.243 Courts have focused their analysis on this second search, as it
implicates greater privacy concerns. Courts have not analyzed each and every
database search; instead, the focus has been on whether the type of search, the
comparison of one DNA sample to another, is reasonable.244 The concept that all
comparisons of DNA samples are created equal is problematic, because depending
on at what point during the criminal investigation and prosecution the subject is at,
the government’s interests and the person’s privacy expectations vary.245 It is more
analytically accurate and practical to consider the database search not as the one
search phase in a two-part search, but rather as two distinct search types depending
on whether the subject is still facing charges.
The first of these search types is DNA specimen comparisons of those profiles
from people the government is still investigating, prosecuting, or has already
convicted. The second search type is the DNA profile comparisons of people who
have had the charges dismissed, been found not guilty, or exonerated in any other
manner. Analyzing the statute as involving two types of database searches provides
a more effective way of determining in what situations Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA
statute is constitutional.

238

See infra Parts III.A-B.

239

People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
240

Buza, 129 Cal. Rprt. 3d at 760.

241

State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
760 (“Courts have routinely held the collection of DNA by means of a blood test is a minimal
intrusion into an individual’s privacy interest in bodily integrity while collection by buccal
swab is even less intrusive.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d
387, 406 (3rd Cir. 2011) (en banc).
242

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2011).

243
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (“The latter search is the true focus of our analysis and
the analyses of other courts that have considered the validity of DNA statutes.”).
244

Id.; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407.

245

See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (determining that parolees
have a diminished expectation of privacy).
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B. Application of the Totality of the Circumstances Test
The totality of the circumstances test requires the balancing of the person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy and the intrusiveness of the government’s
incursion against the government’s interest in effective law enforcement.246 The
balancing test must be applied to each of three distinct search types that Ohio’s
statute requires.247 As this Note has previously discussed, the constitutionality of
arrestee DNA statutes has turned primarily on the arrestee’s diminished expectation
of privacy in his or her identification.248 Courts have also considered the
government’s interest in identifying criminals and have shown preferences that there
be some safeguards to protect the private information contained within DNA
samples.249 The most important factor in determining whether or not an arrestee
DNA statute will be upheld as constitutional is how great is the subject’s expectation
of privacy.250
The first search type is the bodily intrusion that happens during the buccal cheek
swab.251 The primary manner of collecting a DNA sample under Ohio’s arrestee
DNA statute is via a buccal swab, a procedure arguably less intrusive than a forcible
blood draw.252 According to the United States Supreme Court, “blood tests do not
constitute an unduly extensive imposition on individuals’ privacy and bodily
integrity.”253 Ohio courts have also upheld blood sampling as a means of retrieving
DNA samples, stating that it is a “minimal intrusion.”254 The physical swab itself
does not reveal any private information before the sample is added to a database.255
The government’s interest in collecting the swabs for potential evidentiary purposes
and the minimal physical intrusion outweighs the almost negligible privacy concerns
implicated by the swabbing procedure, making this first search type reasonable.256
The second search type implicated by Ohio’s arrestee DNA statute is database
comparisons of people currently under arrest or facing charges. When this type of
search occurs, courts must balance the government’s interest in properly identifying
persons under criminal suspicion against the intrusion into the subject’s expectation
246

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

247

See Eiler, supra note 18, at 1209.

248

See supra Part II.C.1.

249

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407-08.

250

People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
251

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406.

252

Eiler, supra note 18, at 1210; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760.

253

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)).

254

State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing In re Nicholson,
724 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)).
255

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).

256

See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 506-07 (citing Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 (2d
Cir. 2005)) (upholding the buccal swab as a minimal intrusion); United States v. Weikert, 504
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007).
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of privacy in his or her DNA sample.257 The major factor in this determination is
the diminished expectation of privacy that an arrestee still facing charges has in his
identity.258 Law enforcement officials have made a probable cause determination
that a crime has been committed, justifying the arrest, and as a result the subject can
expect privacy incursions as part of the booking procedure and detention.259 Based
on this probable cause determination and the fact that arrestees must submit to
routine booking procedures and detention, an arrestee currently in the criminal
justice system has a diminished expectation of privacy in his identity.260 The
government’s interest in properly identifying arrestees and solving crimes outweighs
the reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her DNA of an arrestee still facing
charges.
The last search type implicated by Ohio’s arrestee DNA statute is the database
comparisons of people who are no longer facing charges because either the charges
were dismissed or they were found not guilty. The constitutionality of this search
type also turns on the subject’s expectation of privacy. Unlike the searches of those
still facing charges, people who are no longer the targets of the criminal justice
system do not have a diminished expectation of privacy.261 In fact, people who have
been found not guilty or have had charges dismissed have the same expectation of
privacy as someone who has never been arrested at all.262 The diminished
expectation of privacy is directly linked to the government having a vested interest in
a person because they pose some risk to society at large. If the criminal justice
system has determined that no such risk exists, there is no justification for a
diminished expectation of privacy.263 The privacy expectation that an innocent
person has in his or her identity and personal information outweighs the
government’s interest in identifying potential criminals. If this were not the case,
then the Fourth Amendment would provide no protection in the area of DNA
sampling and the government could require the warrantless DNA sampling of any
individual.264 This “Orwellian nightmare” is not the state of the law, however, and
since a person’s expectation of privacy outweighs the government’s interest in
identifying potential criminals, the third type of search is unreasonable.265
257
This search type directly parallels the expectation of privacy described in Mitchell.
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410.
258

Id. at 412-13.

259

See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).

260

Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412.

261
In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that the
diminished expectation of privacy present in dealing with convicted offenders was not present
in a juvenile arrestee).
262
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (“[T]he category of arrestees . . . who has not yet been the subject
of a judicial determination of probable cause, falls closer to the ordinary citizen end of the
continuum.”).
263

In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 491.

264

See Eiler, supra note 18, at 1229.

265

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (expressing
concern over the far-reaching implications that allowing arrestee sampling will bring and
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Ohio’s arrestee DNA statute is arguably constitutional as applied only to the
second type of search: those who are still in the criminal justice system. It is not
constitutional when it results in the third type of search.
C. Application of the Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs doctrine cannot be used to justify a search that is primarily for
general law enforcement purposes.266 The reason that arrestee DNA statutes are
analyzed under the special needs doctrine is due to a few circuit courts applying it to
uphold sampling from convicted felons.267 The special needs doctrine has never
been used to uphold the constitutionality of an arrestee DNA statute.268
The special needs doctrine likewise cannot justify any of the three types of
searches implicated by Ohio’s felony-arrestee statute.269 Identifying criminals has
been the primary justification for why the government should be allowed to take
DNA samples from arrestees.270 Other reasons have included deterring future
criminal conduct and protecting communities.271 None of these justifications
survives the first part of the special needs analysis, however, because each one is
simply another way of stating the general purpose of law enforcement. Identifying
and apprehending criminals, deterring future criminals, and protecting our
communities are exactly what law enforcement agencies are designed to do.272 The
purpose of Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute is to provide law enforcement
agencies in Ohio with a more accurate DNA database to solve crimes, and as that is a
general law enforcement purpose, the statute cannot be upheld using the special
needs doctrine.273
D. Ohio’s Expungement Process Not a Solution
Expungement methods are available in many state and federal government
statutory schemes, including Ohio.274 Expungement is the process by which a
convicted person either seals or destroys his or her criminal or other records held by
the government.275 Expungement is problematic because the burden is generally
stating that this opens the door for DNA testing from all people. “My colleagues in the
plurality assure us that, when that day comes, they will stand vigilant and guard the line, but
by then the line—never very clear to begin with—will have shifted.”).
266

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-81 (2001).
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Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 2003); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675,
678 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).
268

United States v. Frank, No. CR-09-2075-EFS-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32542, at *1
(E.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2010).
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See Regensburger, supra note 181, at 386.
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United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 413 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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See Regensburger, supra note 181, at 386.
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United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 2006).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012).
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See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT. § 299C.105
(2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299 (Deering 2013).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (LexisNexis 2012).
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placed entirely on the arrestee, it is not an option available to everyone, and usually
does not end the constitutional violation in a timely manner.276
The burden for seeking expungement is often placed on the individual rather than
the government.277 This is problematic, as it automatically discourages those
attempting to secure expungement of their records because they have to be
proactive.278 Placing the burden on the individual is also problematic in that the
actual expungement process is generally a difficult and lengthy process.279
Ohio’s expungement process allows for a person to request to have his DNA
profile sealed, but only if the BCII receives a “certified copy of a final court order
establishing that the offender’s conviction has been overturned.”280 If there is still
the possibility of appeal or “application of discretionary review,” it is not possible
for a court to grant the sealing of the DNA record.281 The fact that a court cannot
seal a record even after a person has been found not guilty or charges have been
dismissed means that even proactive citizens will still be subject to violations of
their constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.
The sealing of the record in Ohio does not actually destroy the DNA record from
the DNA database; it just restricts the access to the actual sample to those people
listed in the statute.282 One of the groups of people who can still access a sealed
record is law enforcement officials and prosecutors, for the purpose of determining
the proper charges in a criminal prosecution.283 The subsection does not explicitly
mention DNA, but as a DNA profile or a hit therefrom could possibly lead to an
additional charge being added to the current arrestee, it is entirely possible that this
exception could apply to DNA profiles.284 At the very least it is not clear which or if
any of the exceptions to a sealed record apply to DNA profiles.285 The ambiguity in
276

People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted
by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
277

Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782.

278

Id.

279

Id. at 758 (“An arrestee must wait until the statute of limitations has run before
requesting expungement; the court must wait 180 days before it can grant the request; the
court’s order is not reviewable by appeal or by writ; the prosecutor can prevent expungement
by objecting to the request.”).
280

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(H) (LexisNexis 2012).

281

Id.

282

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D) (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that sealed records can
be inspected by law enforcement, parole officers, the subject of the record, and by the BCII
and Attorney General offices as part of background checks).
283

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D)(1). The relevant subsection states:

Inspection of the sealed records included in the order may be made only by the
following persons or for the following purposes: (1) By a law enforcement officer or
prosecutor, or the assistants of either, to determine whether the nature and the
character of the offense with which a person is to be charged would be affected by
virtue of the person’s previously having been convicted of a crime.
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Id.
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32 (LexisNexis 2012).
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the expungement statute opens a door for the possibility of continued searches of a
sealed DNA profile in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches.
Ohio’s current process for sealing records does not end the continuing searching
of an innocent person’s DNA profile, and therefore does not cure Ohio’s DNA law
of its constitutional defect.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO OHIO ’S ALL-ARRESTEE DNA S TATUTE
A. Proposed Judicial and Legislative Solutions
1. Proposed Judicial Solutions: Expanding the Exceptions to the Warrant
Requirement
One possible solution that has been discussed by commentators is a judicial
solution: either expanding the special needs doctrine to encompass DNA sampling or
creating a new exception to the warrant requirement.286
One possible judicial solution would be the creation of a “DNA database
exception” to the warrant requirement, an option advocated by Professor Kaye.287
The reason that a new exception is the preferred choice, according to Professor
Kaye, is based on the fact that arrestee DNA statutes are difficult to analyze under
current precedent and the benefit outweighs the minimal privacy implications.288 In
fact, the privacy implication is almost non-existent under this reasoning; the
“physical intrusion is minimal” and “no additional privacy interest are
implicated.”289 Since the privacy implications are so minimal, a warrant is not
necessary to “protect against unwarranted invasions of privacy” but would place a
real burden on law enforcement’s use of an important tool.290 Professor Kaye is
satisfied as long as there are safeguards in place determining what information is
contained in the sample and who has access to the sample.291
Professor Kaye’s exception would allow for the warrantless DNA sampling of
any citizen without any justification other than law enforcement feigning a need for
the sample.292 The privacy expectation in DNA that she describes is so minimal that
any government justification would suffice.293 As previously discussed, a person
who has been arrested and subsequently had the charges dismissed, was acquitted at
trial, or exonerated at a later time has the same expectation of privacy as someone

286

Kaye, supra note 66, at 498-500; Regensburger, supra note 181, at 387-89.
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Kaye, supra note 66, at 498.

288

Id. at 499.

289

Id. at 499-500. In fact, Professor Kaye actually compares the privacy invasion
implicated by a DNA sample to the privacy invasion that occurs when a fingerprint is taken
during the booking procedure.
290

Id. at 500.

291

Id. at 504.

292

Id. at 500 (describing the Fourth Amendment implications as “de minimis” because
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” are not implicated).
293

Id. at 499-500.
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who has never been arrested.294 The notion that a person is innocent until proven
guilty is one of the cornerstones of America’s judicial system and it applies to both
arrestees and non-arrestees. The privacy expectation that Professor Kaye describes
is so minimal that it would allow for the DNA sampling from not only arrestees but
also every citizen. The DNA testing of all citizens is a brave new world that courts
are not yet ready to accept.295 A new exception to the warrant requirement that
conceivably would allow for the DNA testing of every citizen is too broad of a
solution to implement.
Another possible solution is to revert to the original special needs doctrine before
Edmond and Ferguson added the general law enforcement purposes test.296 The
original understanding of the special needs doctrine was that a special need could be
for a “law enforcement related purpose.”297 The only stipulation was that the
justification for the warrantless search had to be something more than the
“elimination of the individual’s rights” in order to help “the police catch criminals
more quickly.”298
There are two issues with this solution; for one, it flies in the face of precedent
and would be a “radical new theory” even by its creator’s admission.299 The special
needs doctrine may not be a perfect area of the law, but it is a well-established
exception to the warrant requirement that has been used to justify sobriety
checkpoints and school drug testing.300 Reverting to a tougher standard would most
likely put these precedents on shaky legal ground at best.301 The second reason is
that even with this new standard, it is not clear that DNA sampling from felony
arrestees would be upheld. The two proposed special needs for DNA sampling are
that DNA is different from other types of personal information and does not
implicate the same privacy concerns and that it will greatly benefit crime control and
protecting innocent people.302 As previously stated, DNA implicates some serious
privacy concerns with the amount of personal information that it contains.303 At the
very least, however, the idea that “DNA identification information does not
implicate privacy concerns nearly to the same degree as . . . reading habits” is
inaccurate.304 Secondly, crime control and protecting innocent people are not special
294

See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review
granted by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
295

See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
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Regensburger, supra note 181, at 387-88.
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Id. at 388.

298

Id.

299

Id. at 387.
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City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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Regensburger, supra note 181, at 389.
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Id. at 389.
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needs because they are precisely what law enforcement agencies are tasked to do.305
All that changing the special needs doctrine would do is eliminate a person’s privacy
protection in their personal information in order to more easily catch criminals based
on a DNA match.306 Therefore, the reversion to an original understanding of the
special needs doctrine would not solve the problem of the constitutionality of
arrestee DNA statutes.
2. Proposed Legislative Solution: Delaying the Addition of the Sample to the
Database
Another proposal has been to rewrite the federal version of an all-arrestee statute
to delay the addition of a DNA specimen to the database.307 The proposed process
would allow for the law enforcement agency to collect the specimen at arrest, but the
specimen would not be analyzed or compared to other DNA profiles until after the
subject was found guilty of the offense of arrest or the subject consented to the
analysis.308 The reason for the delay is based on the argument that the only search
required by an all-arrestee DNA statute that is constitutional is the physical cheek
swab.309
This argument that any addition of a DNA specimen to a DNA database is an
unreasonable invasion of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
contrary to the weight of authority and an application of the totality of the
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United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 2006).

306

Regensburger, supra note 181, at 390.

307

Eiler, supra note 18, at 1230-31 (proposing that the DNA specimen be held in a separate
database until either the arrestee is convicted or the arrestee consents to the analysis and
addition of the DNA specimen).
308

Id. at 1231-32. The proposed language for the revision of the federal statute is as
follows:
(A) The Attorney General shall, as prescribed by the Attorney General through
regulation, store such unanalyzed DNA samples in a databank that is not link to
CODIS, nor searchable by any law enforcement official for any crime-solving
purpose.
(B) The Attorney General shall, upon the occurrence of either of the events in
subparagraph (i) or (ii) below, furnish the analyzed DNA sample to the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, who shall carry out a DNA analysis on each such
DNA sample and include the results in CODIS—
(i) the conviction of the individual arrestee for a charge stemming from the
circumstances that led to her arrest; or
(ii) the knowing or voluntary consent of the individual arrestee for analysis of
her DNA sample and the inclusion of the results in CODIS by the Attorney
General.
(C) If neither of the events detailed in the subparagraphs (i) or (ii) occur, the Attorney
General shall, upon final disposition in favor of an arrestee of any charges stemming
from the circumstances that led to her arrest, remove the arrestee’s DNA sample from
the databank described in paragraph (2)(A) and destroy it.
309

Id. at 1219-20 (“It is only when the government goes beyond the physical extraction of
DNA that an individual’s expectation of privacy in her personal information is invaded.”).
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circumstances test to Ohio’s felony-arrestee DNA statute.310 The only searches that
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment are those that continue to occur after
the person has been found not guilty, the charges have been dismissed, or they have
been exonerated in any manner.311 This places a heavy burden on law enforcement
because during the time it would take to determine someone’s eventual guilt or
innocence, the sample could be analyzed and lead to the solving of unsolved rapes
and murders.312 Thus, delaying the addition of samples to a DNA database is
unnecessary because although it definitely secures the privacy interests of innocent
people, it also places a burden on the government that the Fourth Amendment does
not require.
B. Automatic Expungement as the Best Solution
In order to achieve the proper balance and cure Ohio’s DNA law of its
constitutional defects, the continuing searches of innocent citizens’ DNA profiles
must be eliminated.313 The best solution is an automatic expungement process for
DNA samples.314 Automatic expungement requires that the DNA sample and
accompanying profile be destroyed as soon as the charges are dropped or the accused
is found not guilty.315 Automatic expungement has two major benefits over the
current system of sealing records.316 For one, the sample is actually destroyed,
meaning that there is no possibility of any intentional or accidental future searches
and constitutional violations.317
The second reason is that an automatic
expungement, rather than proactive record sealing, ensures that every person is
protected from constitutional violations, not just those with understanding and
knowledge of the system.
Automatic expungement would go even farther than the current expungement
statute by requiring that a person originally convicted but later exonerated will also
have his or her DNA profile destroyed.318 The exoneration portion will apply only if
the person has no other convictions for which their DNA sample would have been
lawfully collected.
310

See supra Part III; see also Eiler, supra note 18, at 1230. Much of Eiler’s analysis was
based on the Western District of Pennsylvania’s decision in Mitchell. The circuit court’s
overruling of the district court’s decision makes Eiler’s conclusion that only the initial swab is
constitutional unpersuasive.
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See supra Part III.
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Maddux, supra note 236, at 117-18 (using two cases as examples of how an all-arrestee
DNA statute could have provided evidence that could have potentially stopped a rapist from
harming more victims).
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See supra Parts III and IV.A.
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MINN. STAT. § 299C.105 Subd. 3 (2012) (requiring the destruction of the “biological
specimen” when the person is found not guilty, but the person must request destruction if
charges are dismissed).
315

See infra Part IV.C.
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This revision will mean that the only searches required by Ohio’s statute will be
those that are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment tests. The unreasonable
searches of innocent people’s DNA profiles will no longer occur because the
samples and accompanying profiles will have been destroyed.
C. Proposed Statutory Language
The following are the proposed revisions to Ohio’s current all-arrestee DNA
statute:319
(F) Any person who is required to submit to a DNA specimen collection
procedure under division (B)(1) of this section, who is acquitted, has the
charges against them dropped, dismissed, or is exonerated in any manner
will have their DNA sample and profile automatically expunged from any
database pursuant to the procedures of the Automatic DNA Expungement
Act.320
(G) Any person who is required to submit a DNA specimen under
division (B)(2)-(4) but is later exonerated of the charge and has no
other charges that would require them to submit a DNA specimen, will
have their DNA sample and profile automatically expunged from any
database pursuant to the procedures of the Automatic DNA
Expungement Act.321
The language of the Automatic DNA Expungement Act is as follows: “The
Automatic DNA Expungement Act’s purpose is to ensure that Ohio’s DNA
samples and the resulting searches of them are done in a manner that is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Ohio
Constitution.”322
(A) As used in this section:
(1) “Acquittal” means being found not guilty of the charged offense
(2) “Dismissal of charges” means that the person is no longer being
charged with the offense of arrest.
(3) “Exoneration” means the reversal of a guilty conviction upon
appeal, not to include pardons, or clemency, not to include remanding
for a new trial, parol, or any other type of early release programs.

319

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (LexisNexis 2012) (corresponding headings to the
actual statute).
320
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (sampling from all felony
arrestees).
321

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(2)-(4) (LexisNexis 2012) (explaining the process
of sampling from convicted offenders).
322

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.105 Subd. 3 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.055(11)
(2012). The basic framework of automatically destroying DNA samples is similar to the
Minnesota and Missouri statutes; however, the proposed changes require a stricter
expungement process and explain some of the procedure in greater detail.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

35

564

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:529

(4) “DNA,” “DNA analysis,” “DNA specimen,” “DNA database,” and
“DNA record” have the same meanings as in section 109.573 of the
Revised Code.323
(B)(1) Upon the dismissal of charges, acquittal or any other means of
exoneration from a person arrested or indicted for a felony the arresting
law enforcement agency, or dismissing court will notify the Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation that the person DNA specimen
and accompany profile is to be automatically expunged.
(2) Upon the exoneration of any convicted felon for any reason, the
reversing court will notify the Bureau of Criminal Identification and
Investigation of the person’s exoneration and the Bureau of Criminal
Identification and Investigation will automatically expunge the
person’s DNA specimen and accompany profile.
(C)(1) The Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification must
destroy the DNA specimen, the DNA record and any accompanying
identification records.
(2) The Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Identification will have
15 days to destroy the DNA specimen and DNA record. Upon the
completion of the automatic expungement process the Bureau of
Criminal Investigation and Identification will notify the samplee in
writing that his or her DNA record has been expunged.
(3) The Director of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation and
Identification may prescribe rules for the efficient expungement of
DNA specimen and DNA records in accordance with Chapter 119 of
the Revised Code.
(D) This section does not preclude the admissibility of any DNA matches
or other evidence linked to a DNA sample match while the DNA
specimen was lawfully contained in a DNA database at the time the
analysis was conducted.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have begun a slow and steady march towards permitting the inclusion of
DNA samples from anyone arrested for any offense. The proposed creation of a new
warrant exception, the expansion of the special needs doctrine, or the legislative
revision of statutes to delay the implementation are in stark contrast to precedent
323

OHIO R EV. CODE ANN. § 109.573(A) (LexisNexis 2012). The pertinent definitions

are:
(A) As used in this section: (1) “DNA” means human deoxyribonucleic acid. (2)
“DNA analysis” means a laboratory analysis of a DNA specimen to identify
DNA characteristics and to create a DNA record. (3) “DNA database” means a
collection of DNA records from forensic casework or from crime scenes,
specimens from anonymous and unidentified sources, and records collected
pursuant to sections 2152.74 and 2901.07 of the Revised Code and a population
statistics database for determining the frequency of occurrence of characteristics
in DNA records. (4) “DNA record” means the objective result of a DNA
specimen, including representations of DNA fragments lengths, digital images of
autoradiographs, discrete allele assignment numbers, and other DNA specimen
characteristics that aid in establishing the identity of an individual. (5) “DNA
specimen” includes human blood cells or physiological tissues or body fluids.
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dealing with these issues. Until the Supreme Court decides how much protection the
Fourth Amendment guarantees in the area of DNA sampling, Ohio’s best recourse is
to revise its current DNA collection scheme with the addition of an automatic
expungement procedure.
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